In the past few years the use of unmanned aerial vehicles in Lithuania has significantly increased. However, enjoying the advantages of this technology, which improves society's socio-economical safety (public safety in a broad sense), raises some privacy concerns. This article analyses European Union and national legal regulations regarding the use of unmanned aerial vehicles as well as legal tools for defence of the right to privacy or prevention from its breaches in the Republic of Lithuania. Unmanned aerial vehicles have become popular only recently; thus, legislation regarding their use has not yet become a common topic among lawyers. Furthermore, case law of the Republic of Lithuania is silent about it. Thus, the authors model a situation of breach of privacy using an unmanned aerial vehicle and analyse possible defence mechanisms.
INTRODUCTION
By analysing the earlier mentioned practical example, this article aims to find whether the current regulation is sufficient and if not, to suggest ways how, with minimum restrictions, to properly regulate the use of the UAS (as it would serve for the insurance of people's public security) so that the right to privacy of others is not breached and at the same time the benefits of the use of UAS are taken. The authors analyse the main operating principles of UAS, legal regulation in Lithuania and suggest possible solutions on how the regulation could be adjusted in order to achieve this aim.
UAS AND THEIR OPERATING PRINCIPLES

THE DESCRIPTION AND DEFINITION OF UAS
As Lithuanian legislation suggests, unmanned aircraft is any aircraft without a crew (including toy models and air-models), which can be operated remotely or automatically, as well as free flying aircraft. 8 There is great confusion between the concepts describing the mechanisms, most commonly called as "drones", because it is not always clear whether devices, programmed to fly autonomously without the involvement of an operator, controlling 7 equivalent, "drones" is used, even though it is indicated that the information on the website is based on the same topic as mentioned previously. Moreover, in Riga Declaration on Remotely Piloted Aircraft (drones) "Framing the Future of Aviation" 14 RPAS are equated with the term "drones" (indication of the word "drones" in brackets).
For the purposes of clarity, this article uses the term Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) as it includes both: aerial vehicles operated by pilot from a distance, and aerial devices programmed to fly autonomously without the involvement of an operator controlling the system from a distance, as both of them could be the tools of achieving all earlier mentioned drones' advantages and, accordingly, breaching people's right to privacy (as they both could be used as camera platforms or intruding objects). A person programming the device to fly automatically could be called an operator as well. Thus, we contend that both types of UAS could be treated as drones. And seems 9 Kārtība, kādā veicami bezpilota gaisa kuģu un tādu cita veida lidaparātu lidojumi, kuri nav kvalificējami kā gaisa kuģi (Regulations on the operation of unmanned aerial vehicles), Official Gazette (2016, no. 231), art. 2, sec. 1. 10 EU, "Communication for the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, A New Era for Aviation. Opening the aviation market to the civil use of remotely piloted aircraft systems in a safe and sustainable manner" (April 2014) // http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52014DC0207&from=EN. 11 Ibid. 12 Ibid. 13 EU, "Unmanned aircraft (drones)" // https://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/air/uas_en. 14 "Riga Declaration," supra note 5. the operator of the UAS from breaching someone's right to privacy, as the aforementioned restricted areas are connected more with public security. Secondly, the UAS may have zoom cameras adjusted to photograph and record videos. The recorded material can be of such a quality that it might be used for "inspecting cell towers or wind turbines to get a very detailed look at structures, wires, modules and components to detect damage." 18 Furthermore, the development of technologies used on the UAS is surprising, as in 2016 Time-of-Flight 3D depth camera sensors started being mounted on drones.
ToF depth ranging camera sensors are used for object scanning, indoor navigation, obstacle avoidance, gesture recognition, tracking objects, measuring volumes, reactive altimeters, 3D photography, augmented reality games, etc. 19 With Lidar and photogrammetry mapping, the UAS can be programmed to fly over an area using 15 "Proposal," supra note 7. 16 18 Ibid. 19 Ibid.
autonomous GPS waypoint navigation. The camera on the drone could be taking photographs at 0.5 or 1 second intervals and when these photos are stitched together, the 3D image is created.
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All these technological advantages open spectacular opportunities to increase people's lives by improving their socio-economic interests. On the other hand, all of them increase the risk of breaching other people's right to privacy.
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LEGAL EU, INTERNATIONAL, AND NATIONAL REGULATION(S)
The best tool to tackle possible breaches of privacy caused by the usage of UAS is obviously legal regulation. European Union and national legislation are analysed below in order to understand whether it is sufficient and capable of protecting people from misuse of the UAS.
RELATED EUROPEAN UNION LEGISLATION, INTERNATIONAL
LEGISLATION
As the norms of European Union law are a constituent part of the legal system of the Republic of Lithuania and have supremacy over the national laws, 22 it could be said that the most important regulation on the use of drones is set at the European is being prepared by the European Commission. 24 However, currently we have 20 Ibid. 21 It is important to note that European Union Agency for Network and Information Security has been making a great effort in "bridging the gap between the legal framework and the available technological implementation measures by providing an inventory of existing approaches, privacy design strategies, and technical building blocks of various degrees of maturity from research and development. Starting from the privacy principles of the legislation, important elements are presented as a first step towards a design process for privacy-friendly systems and services" (ENISA, "Privacy And Data Protection By Design" (January 2015) // https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/privacy-and-data-protection-by-design), even though the researches have shown that the interviewed "developers and the researcher (D1-D5, R1) stated that privacy is too abstract of a problem to solve technically. D2 even stated 'that [it] is not possible' to solve technically. They argued that during the development process, it is not foreseeable how privacy will be situated in the contexts in which the system is to be used" (Sven Braun, Michael Friedewald, and Human Rights has also stressed that it would be too restrictive to limit the notion of "private life" to an "inner circle" in which the individual may live his or her own personal life as he or she chooses, thus excluding entirely the outside world not encompassed within that circle. 36 In order to determine whether the notion of "private life" is protected in a particular situation, the Court has on several occasions examined whether individuals had a reasonable expectation that their privacy would be respected and in that context, it has stated that a reasonable expectation of privacy is a significant though not necessarily conclusive factor. 37 Adjusting the above interpretation to the example given at the beginning could be possible only if the operator of the UAS was the governmental body. However, even if the case law of the European Court of Human Rights is not applicable in the given example, the earlier mentioned rulings give the general understanding of the extent and essence of the right to privacy. Besides, the application of the criteria of reasonable expectation of privacy is supported quite widely. For example, section 7(1) of Surveillance Devices Act 1999 (Vic) (Australia) states that private activity is defined 30 Ibid., point 1. as an activity carried on in circumstances that may reasonably be taken to indicate that the parties to it desire it to be observed only by themselves, but does not include an activity carried on in any circumstances in which the parties to it ought reasonably to expect that it may be observed by someone else. 38 The courts of the USA also support the criteria of actual (subjective) expectation of privacy.
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The right to privacy in European Union level is enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (hereinafter called the EU Charter).
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The preamble of the EU Charter points out that the Charter reaffirms the rights also Thus, the General Data Protection Regulation could also be applied in the context of the regulation of the use of UAS and its relation with the protection of the right to privacy. However, it is important to note that the General Data Protection Regulation shall not apply to the processing of personal data by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household activity. So, if the claimant cannot prove that the activities of UAS operator exceeds the limits of personal or household activity, he/she will not be able to base the claim and arguments on this regulation.
These are the main and most important legal acts (or their projects) directly or indirectly governing (or the ones that shall be governing) the use of UAS at the international and EU levels.
THE MAIN RELEVANT LEGAL REGULATION(S) IN LITHUANIA
The legal act governing the use of drones (weighing up to 25 kilograms) in of the rules talks about technical requirements of the UAS, their managers' duties before using them (to check all control elements, etc.).
However, obeying these rules does not prevent the manager of the UAS from breaching somebody's right to privacy by taking photos of someone's home or any other private space, like in the previous example.
Considering the topic of this article, and the fact that the previously mentioned acts are not oriented towards protection of the right to privacy, it is important to discuss what legal acts ensure the protection of people's right to privacy which could be breached by using UAS, at the national level in Lithuania. ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 10, NUMBER 2 2017
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'Personal data' means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person ('data subject'); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person".
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Considering the earlier discussed technical abilities of the UAS, it can be said that unlawfully gathering any personal data with a help of UAS and for commercial purposes is also a breach of these two previously mentioned legal acts and, accordingly, privacy of the subject of personal data. The unlawfulness gathering of any personal data can be easily completed as the requirements of the two previously mentioned legal acts are too difficult to accomplish not only for a natural, but even for a legal person. However, this moves beyond the scope of this article.
Because the LPDLP is aligned with current EU regulation on personal data protection, it also does not apply to the processing of personal data by a natural person in the course of personal or household activity. It is hardly possible to prove that the images taken by the use of UAS shall be used for commercial, business purposes (for example, a part of wedding movie is used to promote operator's business). Therefore the protection provided by LPDLP is not actually effective if the UAS is used by a natural person.
It has to be noted that video surveillance is generally treated as legally permissible behaviour, but the latter law clearly and precisely sets the conditions under which the video surveillance is permitted, establishes imperative requirements for this action and defines peculiarities of liability for violations related to the organization of video surveillance.
The video surveillance in the LPDLP is described as the processing of video data related to a natural person only and when automatic video surveillance devices (cameras) are used without giving importance to the fact of whether such data is stored or not. The video surveillance under the provisions of LPDLP is reasonable only for public order, health, safety, assets, other peoples' rights and freedoms protection and the information that video surveillance is being in operation and by whom must be clearly and understandably provided. The LPDLP also provides prohibitions of wider scope video surveillance than necessary, video surveillance of dwelling place or its private territory or entrance to it, video surveillance in a shared property if there is no majority's consent and, of course, video surveillance in places where the presence of total privacy is expected and/or when such surveillance injures a person's dignity (toilets, changing rooms, etc.). 51 General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 42, art. 4(1).
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As previously mentioned, privacy violations using drones are usually occasioned by video surveillance, data capture and publicity; therefore it is essential that the legal regulations (if not EU, at least national ones) contain precise requirements, which connect with not only the identification of UAS, but also which contain analogical requirements, as mentioned above (set in the LPDLP). ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 10, NUMBER 2 2017
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As it has been seen, the right to privacy is quite sufficiently regulated at the EU and national levels (except for provisions of Civil code of the Republic of Lithuania), whereas regulation connected with UAS, taking into consideration its specificity, is not satisfactory. Current regulation on the use of UAS is not sufficient for insurance of article 2.23 of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania because direct regulation on the use of UAS is related to the insurance of physical safety only, whereas privacy protection matters are left to the laws issued at the times when the UAS were not widely used.
LEGAL ASSUMPTIONS REGARDING LIABILITY FOR PRIVACY VIOLATIONS IN LITHUANIA
The European Court of Human Rights in its jurisprudence has stated that "the domestic law must <...>afford appropriate safeguards to prevent any such disclosure as may be inconsistent with the guarantees in Article 8 of the Convention." 57 Thus, the European Union or national law should not only set the rules on the use of UAS, but also ensure that these rules are complied with and are effective. One of the tools discouraging people from breaching the rules is penalties or threatening duty to compensate for non-pecuniary damage.
Lithuanian national laws provide for three types of liability for the breaches of law related to the privacy and use of UAS: civil, administrative and criminal. actions and the damages) and damages (broken relationship, stress, etc. in terms of money) could also be proven. Meanwhile "fault, as a concept of civil liability, is understood as a subjective (actual) carelessness -the inability of a person to be properly careful, prudent and attentive in a particular situation" or may be expressed by intention. 62 Considering the fact that the film-maker was not careful enough with the recorded material to cut out the details of the third persons' private life, it could be treated that the claimant could theoretically defend her right to privacy by filing a civil action and claiming for damages.
However, the most questionable topic in defence of privacy under civil law norms is the lack of strict liability. If the infringer insisted that his fault in the given situation did not exist as he was not able to foresee the consequences that were caused by filming of the yard and the disclosure of the video (the people in the video were recorded acting in a decent manner, the faces could not be seen), he would probably avoid civil liability. Also, the infringer could insist that he never intended to make the video public but it became public because somebody gained access to his files and spread the video on the internet. Furthermore, the infringer could also assert that there was no invasion into victim's private territory as neither him, nor UAS invaded the victim's private territory, as the space above the land and belonging to the land owner was not physically entered.
Even though theoretically the injured person could call for the violator's civil liability, it does not mean that her claim would succeed, as too many elements of civil liability need to be proven. precise indication that it is allowed to record sounds, take photographs or to film. 69 In urgent cases it is allowed to carry out secret surveillance with prior permission of prosecutor or pre-trial investigation officer. 70 However, in such a case within three days the ruling, confirming the necessity of such urgent secret surveillance, of the investigating judge must be received. If not, all information must be destroyed. 71 One author has said that "the dawn of the age of the drones and the potential it holds for bad as well as good provides a new challenge where the law needs to catch up in a quick and orderly fashion." 72 It seems that Lithuanian legislation is doing exactly that because after realising that the UAS have become a tool of reconnaissance, a new law, setting state border guard officials' right to use violence against UAS appearing in the border area, has come into effect since 1 January 2018. 73 This also confirms the specificity of UAS (that it is an object requiring for a special regulation). However, as has been seen, "while persistent, penetrating, or technologically sophisticated remote sensing by government or police is subject to the warrant requirements <…>, there are no such constraints on civil or commercial remote sensing;" 74 therefore the protection of individuals' privacy in such cases becomes complicated.
CONCLUSIONS
The question raised at the beginning of this article was whether the regulation described was sufficient, and if yes, was it an obstacle for achieving better public security as it is understood in this article (public security in a broad sense, including socio-economic interests)? Thus, as the misuser of the UAS theoretically could find the ways to avoid both criminal and civil liability, the tool helping to prevent such misuse of UAS could be administrative liability, which, in order to be exercised, does not require proof of the harmful consequences of any breach of the Rules. The person could be punished with administrative penalty only by proving that he has breached the Rules.
However, taking as an example the situation in which a UAS occasionally flies over a private territory, none of the points of the Rules forbid such actions (of course, if 50 meters rules is followed, the UAS is not used in forbidden areas and other conditions named in point 10 of the Rules). Thus, it could be said that the owner of a private territory does not have legal means to protect herself from implied breach of her privacy.
Current regulation as applied in the Republic of Lithuania does not prohibit flying UAS over private territory if it is not located in a town or city, as airspace above Even though the UAS trigger real and clear privacy concerns, at the same time they offer well appreciated benefits. When adjusting new and current laws to the increased popularity of the UAS, the new restrictions on UAV surveillance cannot be tailored narrowly because it is difficult to anticipate possible technical capabilities of the UAS in the future. And even if the UAS make a great contribution to public security, people's right to privacy should not be forgotten and, most importantly, the mechanisms created to defend it must be effective.
As the restrictions of the UAS cannot be too narrow in order not to lose access to the benefits of UAS, the national courts are the ones capable of applying the law in a manner ideally matching the current period, balancing between that time's technological level and the level of people's need for privacy. As the UAS become more popular in Lithuania and more easily accessible to civil users, and if the case law is still silent about privacy issues arising out of the use of the UAS, "we are floating in a state of limbo where privacy threats are real and we don't have proper tools to keep ourselves guarded from them." 75 Thus, attention must be paid to what practical problems and solutions will arise in national case law.
People have an undeniable right to buy and fly UAS. They are used not only by private, but by governmental subjects. Acquiring drones is governed by norms, regulated by legal relations of purchase and sale, but because of specificity of UAS, the acquirer must also undertake certain obligations, observe the rules of its usage, and know the basics of protection of the right to privacy. Correspondingly, the state has a duty to regulate these legal relations in a manner that does not deny the interests of UAS owners and third parties. 
